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According to the literature, psychological assessment in forensic contexts is one of the
most controversial application areas for clinical psychology. This paper presents a review
of systematic judgment errors in the forensic field. Forty-six psychological reports written
by psychologists, court consultants, have been analyzed with content analysis to identify
typical judgment errors related to the following areas: (a) distortions in the attribution of
causality, (b) inferential errors, and (c) epistemological inconsistencies. Results indicated
that systematic errors of judgment, usually referred also as “the man in the street,” are
widely present in the forensic evaluations of specialist consultants. Clinical and practical
implications are taken into account. This article could lead to significant benefits for
clinical psychologists who want to deal with this sensitive issue and are interested in
improving the quality of their contribution to the justice system.
Keywords: assestment, clinical trials as topic, bias, forensic psychiatry, forensic psychology, systematic error
INTRODUCTION
This study refers to the application of clinical psychology in the forensic area (“forensic
psychology”), which focuses on the interface between the justice system and mental health
evaluation. A forensic psychologist, an expert in appropriately interacting with judges, attorneys
and other legal professionals, is responsible to testify in court, reformulating psychological ﬁndings
into the legal language of the courtroom and providing information to legal personnel in a
form that can be understood (Melton et al., 1997). His/her competency is fundamental since
the judge usually expected to educate himself on facts that may need additional interpretation
and information by technical disciplines; in fact, the judge himself, an expert in legal matters,
cannot go beyond his personal experience and knowledge and is inclined to use categories of
common sense for personality evaluations (Heilbrun, 2001; Heilbrun et al., 2004). The main
roles of a psychologist in the court system are eightfold: Evaluation of possible malingering,
Assessment of mental state for insanity plea, Competency to stand trial, Prediction of violence
and assessment of risk, Evaluation of child custody in divorce, Assessment of personal injury,
Interpretation of polygraph data, and Specialized forensic personality assessment (Otto and
Heilbrun, 2002; DeClue, 2005). “Questions” asked by the court of the forensic psychologist are
generally related to a legal question rather than to a psychological one. As an example, the judge
may appoint a forensic psychologist to assess the state of mind of the defendant at the time of
the oﬀense. Since the “question” is posed in legal terms (the responsibility for the crime), the
forensic psychologist is called to translate psychological information (about the sanity or insanity
of the person) into a legal framework. The forensic psychologist is thus invested with a great
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responsibility in providing the assessment information, including
the diagnosis, treatment and any other information the judge
requests, such as information regarding mitigating factors,
and evaluation of witness credibility. Forensic psychology also
involves training and evaluating police or other law enforcement
personnel, providing law enforcement with criminal proﬁles and
working in other ways with police departments. That is why
he/she needs to be an expert advisor who can translate the
words in the judge’s question into common sense technical-
scientiﬁc constructs on which to base the assessment. The lexical
formulations with which the judge indicates the scope and
limitations of the investigation have been entrusted to an expert
to create conventional “questions.” Just the interdisciplinary
character of the matter can give rise to some criticalities in
the role of the advisory forensic psychologist, particularly with
respect to the complexity of applying psychological knowledge
in such a diﬀerent system as that of the Law (Nicholson and
Norwood, 2000; Goldstein, 2003, 2006 ). The fact that forensic
psychology is a relatively recent development that made its
appearance in the universities in the late 1960s (Ogloﬀ, 2002;
Kovera et al., 2003) explains why there is no precise mode
of action for the advising and assessment needs of the judge,
but cannot constitute an excuse in the search for a rigorous
deﬁnition of the plan of investigation (Drogin, 2001; Drogin
and Barrett, 2003). The situation is delicate because the forensic
ﬁeld diﬀers from many other areas (Rogers, 2000). For example,
in a clinical ﬁeld, a “inadeguate assessment” can be corrected
afterward by psychologists or by others, but within forensics,
the technical advice cannot be modiﬁed subsequently, and can
therefore mislead the judge, with serious consequences for the
freedom or the health of a third party (Greenberg and Shuman,
1997; Strasburger et al., 1997; Wiener et al., 2002). From this we
can understand the foregone conclusion of how important it is
to have a strong commitment to the epistemological framework,
and be explicitly aware of the assumptions and expectations
underpinning the methods used (Walker and Woody, 2011;
McAuliﬀ and Bornstein, 2012; Iudici and Renzi, 2015a).
LEGAL SCIENCES AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCES
The diagnostic evaluation in the forensic ﬁeld, therefore, reﬂects
the need to combine skills from diﬀerent disciplines, especially
the sciences of the psyche and the science of law (Drogin, 2007;
Drogin et al., 2011). From the ﬁrst, recognized as the referring
science, come theories, paradigms, methods and tools, from
the second, assumed to be just referring of context, comes a
normative frame within which the forensic advisor may work,
deﬁning the role and tasks (Wrightsman, 1999; De Leo and
Patrizi, 2002; Grisso, 2003; Grisso and Vincent, 2005; Patrizi,
2012). Sometimes the evaluation results tend to subordinate the
former to the latter, accepting the conﬁguration of the “events”
as they predeﬁne the code or the jurisprudence. In turn, the
judge is called to pronounce on “facts” legally conﬁgured as
the law (and implicitly, common sense) imposes. Nevertheless,
as the judge cannot exceed his/her personal experience, some
technical aid is required from the experts; however, this aid is
bound to remain within its epistemic paradigm, and in fact, since
the question to which the advisor reponds is legally codiﬁed,
conﬁgured and preordained by the codes (and law) (Lind and
Tyler, 1988; Boccaccini et al., 2002). The request, however,
is guided by the implications of common sense (“ingenuous
theories of mind and personality,” Bruner and Tagiuri, 1954)
more than from coherent applications using the methods of the
psychological science. For example, the advisor may be invited to
assess a defendant on the understanding of intent, on the social
danger, on the parenting skills, or on the competence to stand
trial.
Since these expressions are borrowed from the legal or
common language, the requests are not always the object’s
employer. Terms like “real motivation,” “in personological
characteristics,” “personality of the child” can appear clear under
the lexical proﬁle or by the common meaning, but are not
rigorous in terms of scientiﬁc construct, that should always be
speciﬁed; otherwise you may incur an improper reiﬁcation. For
details, consult Iudici and Verdecchia (2015b) and Iudici et al.
(2015).
The scientiﬁc constructs require precise epistemological
clariﬁcation, and therefore the skill to distinguish the discourse
of the “man in the street” for their references of knowledge.
This explains the demand for specialist opinion that goes beyond
the common experience (Dalby, 1997; Gudjonsson and Haward,
1998).
There is no doubt that it is hard work to convert scientiﬁc
knowledge into the methods and the criteria of “objective”
(Drogin et al., 2011). For example, a request might ask the
adviser, “What are the causes that lead the child to reject
the meeting with the non-custodial parent?” The advisor must
transform their own interpretations, suppositions, hypotheses,
in “certain cases,” and is required to establish to whom the
responsibility of such refusal is imputed (transformation of the
cause in guilt, in the interpretation of causation, and reduction
of a semeiotic interactive process in a linear determinism).
In this situation, the opinion of the technician becomes a
“judgment,” legally usable. The diﬃculty is to integrate two
diﬀerent epistemic levels to merge the requirements of the
“legal truth” with the criteria of the scientiﬁc demonstration
(Salvini et al., 2008). Also from a cognitive point of view,
the process “constative” (facts) and “assessment” (constructs)
develop diﬀerent modes of reasoning, which, if they overlap,
can lead to errors of attribution, which we shall discuss in the
following paragraph.
THE SYSTEMATIC ERRORS OF
JUDGMENT
Forensic psychiatrists, psychologists and criminologists, despite
the diversity of professional trainings and skills, traditionally
share a similar purpose, strongly oriented to meet the judge’s
expectations, translated into the formality of the put “question”
(Shapiro, 1991). In many cases, the question focuses on
the personality construct, and the consultant is asked to
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investigate, describe and explain the way of being and acting of
people whose behaviors have acquired or may acquire a legal
signiﬁcance.
The generative matrix, and the focal point of this conceptual
system is the “forensic assessment,” which intersects, as
already observed, the description, explanation, evaluation, and
argumentation (Cervone and Peake, 1986; Pohl, 2004).
The present research will use some knowledge from the
“psychology of the attribution,” an area in which researchers
have studied how the formation of judgments, expressed with an
evaluative scope, explanatory and predictive, can be inﬂuenced
by the underlying processes of assessment, like inferences,
attributions of cause and its heuristic (Chapman and Johnson,
2002; Englich et al., 2006; Eerland and Rassin, 2012).
Processes that the cognitive psychologists and the social
psychologists have dedicated themselves to understanding; and
perhaps for this reason they have been extraneous to the
knowledge of forensic and clinical psychology and psychiatry.
The cognitive processes by which people judge others, make
decisions, explain the causes of behavior, assess situations, use
persuasive arguments, and implement reasoning, is a research
area that has produced several important results. To try to explain
how this can favor “systematic errors of judgment” is the focus on
which it seems appropriate to dwell (Marshall and Alison, 2007;
Bollingmo et al., 2009).
Limitations and Risks of Forensic
Expertise
If in the past the knowledge resources related to the preparation
of an appraisal were limited, today many scholars have researched
the limits of expert reports (Saks and Koehler, 2005) and deﬁned
guidelines for improving the work of the forensic technicians
(Committee on Ethical Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists,
1991; American Psychological Association [APA], 2013).
There are several studies that highlight how experts in
forensics might contaminate their own appraisal activities
through bias, both historically (Miller, 1984; Stoel et al., 2014)
and in the recent past (Proia, 2005; Budowle et al., 2009; Page
et al., 2012).
Researchers’ eﬀorts often focus on diﬀerent themes, for
example the risk of violence in adolescents, violent individuals,
in cases of danger, in the sexual (Herman, 2005.) and in post-
traumatic stress disorder (Grisso and Vincent, 2005). Many
studies have shown how the main problem is the non-distinction
between legal and clinical data [(A discovery generally stood out
in four of the six studies (Greenberg and Shuman, 1997; Christy
et al., 2004)]. Examiners often reported signiﬁcant clinical data,
and the legal matter has often been addressed, but the reports
often do not actually identify the reasoning of the examiner
on the connection between the clinical data and the opinion
of the examiner on the relevant legally deﬁcient candidate. In
other words, he could not explain how their data were related
to their opinions or the logic that connected them. Thomas
Grisso (2003) has systematized a number of issues involved in the
development of expertise, particularly in creating interpretations
and opinions that are not contradictable, the confusion between
data and interpretations, and problems related to the language
used, particularly in the presence of category values.
DESIGN STUDY
The ﬁrst part of the research was carried out in the following
databases: Google Scholar and Scopus. The work dealt with
analyzing some expert reports commissioned by a judge as
part of civil proceedings. The research was divided into two
objectives. The ﬁrst objective aimed to identify the errors of
judgment applied to the ﬁeld in the forensic international
literature. The etymology of the term “error” refers to the
concept of “a way to deviate from established”: here the error
is understood just as a divergence from the objectives that the
forensic consultant intends to pursue. For example, if the aim
is to provide a technical assessment, then judgment distortions
do not have to be produced. If it is intended to follow a logical
reasoning, the paths that go from the premises to the conclusions
must not divert in comparison to the criteria of the schemes
of logical reasoning. If the objective is to provide objective
assessments, there should be no moral or value judgments.
The criteria used in the identiﬁcation of expertise was the
surveyor mandate, or speciﬁcally the request by the court for
“observation activities” and “psychological assessment of the
personality structure of the parents.” All reports were compiled
by a technical oﬃce adviser, or by consultants registered in
the speciﬁc register of each Court. At the end of the study,
only those relationships performed by professional psychologists
were considered. The reports identiﬁed relate to the period
2010–2013. The eligibility criteria were: errors of attributions
in forensic ﬁeld, judgment systematic errors in forensic ﬁeld,
bias in the attribution of causality in forensic ﬁeld, inferential
errors in forensic ﬁeld, epistemological inconsistencies in forensic
ﬁeld.
METHODS
The purpose of highlighting the possible errors was initially
pursued by developing research in the social psychological
literature, juridical and clinical, to identify possible errors and
contextualize in reference to the forensic ﬁeld. The examples
are taken from analysis of 46 forensic relations. The work was
carried out according to a method of qualitative analysis (Flick,
2008) and the procedure adopted is one of those described
by Tuzzi (2003) for the analysis of the content. Speciﬁcally,
we proceeded according to a “classic” approach with manual
encoding of the texts (Miles and Huberman, 1984; Miles and
Huberman, 1994; Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Maxwell, 2005).
The clinical consultants who made their documents available
were recruited by the authors of the research. They signed
an informed consent form about the design and purpose of
the research. All relations were analyzed by two independent
judges into 17 mutually exclusive categories, corresponding to
the systematic judgment errors considered on the basis of the
analysis of semantic content. The level of inter-rater agreement,
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TABLE 1 | Correlation attribution errors.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Fundamental attribution error 1
2 Correspondent inference –0,008 1
3 Constancy 0,128 –0,092
4 Tautology –0,038 0,432∗∗ –0,053 1
5 Norm of internality 0,070 0,232 0,200 0,040 1
6 Attribution to the victim 0,083 –0,020 0,334∗ 0,045 0,000 1
7 Illusory correlation 0,179 0,092 0,292∗ –0,061 –0,005 0,206 1
8 Confirmation bias or verificationism 0,163 0,216 0,370∗ 0,055 0,501∗∗ 0,100 0,362∗ 1
9 Confusion between contiguity and causality 0,216 0,300∗ 0,117 0,109 0,157 –0,030 0,190 0,019 1
10 TOT_Attribution errors 0,416∗∗ 0,520∗∗ 0,520∗∗ 0,369∗ 0,554∗∗ 0,382∗∗ 0,449∗∗ 0,671∗∗ 0,431∗∗ 1
TABLE 2 | Correlation inferential errors.
1 2 3 4 5
1 Argumentum ad hominem 1
2 Added of pragmatic inferencies 0,220 1
3 Availability heuristic 0,302∗ 0,069 1
4 Rapresentativeness heuristic − 0,058 − 0,166 0,048 1
5 TOT_inferential errors 0,702∗∗ 0,485∗∗ 0,602∗∗ 0,401∗∗ 1
TABLE 3 | Correlation epistemological errors.
1 2 3 4 5
1 Reification fallacy 1
2 Interpretation confused like explanation –0,011 1
3 Infringements to the rules interpreted in psychopatological explanation –0,108 –0,147 1
4 Confusion between judgements of value and data of fact –0,037 –0,425∗∗ 0,095 1
5 TOT_Epistemological errors 0,601∗∗ 0,090 0,411∗∗ 0,508∗∗ 1
TABLE 4 | Correlation global errors.
1 2 3 4
1 TOT_Attribution errors 1
2 TOT_Inferential errors –0,171 1
3 TOT_Epistemological errors 0,255 –0,074 1
4 TOT_Global error 0,717∗∗ 0,151 0,793∗∗ 1
∗∗The correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
∗The correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
measured by Cohen’s Kappa coeﬃcient is 0.93. The categories
were predeﬁned by the researchers in accordance with the
literature. Then the frequencies and percentages and descriptive
statistics were calculated (minimum, maximum, mean, standard
deviation) and graphs were created representing the total number
of errors for each area and the average number of total errors by
area.
RESULTS
Regarding the ﬁrst objective, the following errors have been
identiﬁed, grouped in the following areas.
The errors (Appendix 1) were referable to three areas:
(a) The area of distortions in the attribution of causality, or
errors that are encountered when investigating the causes and
responsibility of the behavior, without considering the intentions
of the person and the context (an example is the known one
“fundamental error of attribution”);
- Fundamental attribution error (Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977)
- Correspondent inference (Jones and Davis, 1965)
- Constancy (Mischel, 1993)
- Tautology (Hewstone et al., 1996)
- Norm of internality (Beauvois and Dubois, 1988; Dubois,
2003)
- Attribution to the victim (Lerner, 1980; Lerner and Goldberg,
1999)
- Illusory correlation (Chapman, 1967; Tversky and Kahneman,
1974; Hamilton and Giﬀord, 1976)
- Confusion between contiguity and causality (Hume, 2008;
Puddu, 2000)
- Conﬁrmation bias or veriﬁcationism (Bacon, 1620; Popper,
1959; Jones andHarris, 1967; Jones andNisbett, 1971; Lewicka,
1998) (Figure 1; Table 1, Attribution errors).
(b) The area of the inferential errors, that is those cognitive
strategies that can carry to the construction of false nexuses of
causality (like the heuristic of the availability);
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FIGURE 1 | Attribution errors.
- Argumentum ad hominem (Locke, 1690; McDougall, 1915;
Hamblin, 1970; Woods and Walton, 1972, 1982; Copi, 1986;
Douglas, 2008)
- Added of pragmatic inferences (Gazdar, 1979; Levinson, 1983;
Johnson-Laird, 1983; Johnson-Laird and Byrne, 1991; Sperber
and Wilson, 2002; Wilson and Sperber, 2003)
- Availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974)
- Representativeness heuristic (Kahneman and Tversky, 1972;
Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) (Figure 2; Table 2, Inferential
errors).
(c) The area of epistemological inconsistencies that occur
when the consistency between the theoretical assumptions is
not respected, the tools used and the deﬁnition of the object of
investigation, for example where a descriptive expedient is treated
and measured as if it really existed as an empirical object.
- Reiﬁcation fallacy (also known as concretism, or the fallacy of
misplaced concreteness) (Whitehead, 1919, 1925; Turner and
Edgley, 1980; Jablensky, 1999; Salvini, 2004)
FIGURE 2 | Inferential errors.
- Interpretations confused like explanations (MacCoun, 1998;
Salvini, 2004)
- Infringements to the rules interpreted in psychopathological
explanation (Foucault, 1969; Quadrio and De Leo, 1995;
Salvini, 2004)
- Confusion between judgments of value and data of fact
(Weber, 1922; Nagel, 1961; Scriven, 1974; Plous, 1993; Iudici
and De Aloe, 2007) (Figure 3; Table 3, Epistemologic errors).
Regarding the second objective (see Appendix 2) 840 errors
were identiﬁed: 193 attribution errors (22.98%), 85 inferential
errors (10%) and 562 epistemological errors (66.9%) (Figure 4;
Table 4, Average number of errors por category).
For the ﬁrst identiﬁed area, the types of errors that appear
to be committed more frequently are the error of fundamental
attribution (28/193), the internality norm (28/193) and the auto
conﬁrmation tendency (27/193).
For the second area, the errors that are more often committed
are the argumentum ad hominem (28/85) and the addition
of pragmatic inferences (21/85). For the third area, the most
frequent errors are reiﬁcation (158/562) and confusion between
FIGURE 3 | Epistemological errors.
FIGURE 4 | Average number of errors per category.
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value judgments and factual data (214/562), areas that may
contain errors with higher frequencies.
Data Analysis
Data analysis was performed using the statistical software
SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Sciences [SPSS], 2008)
containing procedures for exploration, management, modeling,
and analysis of a data set. This tool allows to perform basic
statistical analysis (description and data screening, analysis of
the diﬀerence of means, non-parametric statistics), multivariable
statistical analysis (multiple linear regression, factor analysis,
variance analysis, discriminant analysis, multivariable analysis of
variance, cluster analysis) and categorical data analysis (logistic
regression models log linear). The techniques that can be used
are commonly applicable in contexts deﬁned as quantitative
and qualitative. These techniques of data analysis are based
on sophisticated and complex mathematical-statistical models
(Barbaranelli, 2006). An appropriate statistical was calculated
(linear correlation coeﬃcient of Pearson) to evaluate the
existence of signiﬁcant relationships between the variables of
interest: errors of attribution, inferential errors, mistakes, and
epistemological between the three areas and the ‘global error
(Barbaranelli and D’Olimpio, 2007). The Pearson coeﬃcient is
used to measure the correlation between variables at intervals
or equivalent reports. It is the sum of the products of the
standardized scores of the two variables (zxzy) divided by the
number of subjects or observations. This coeﬃcient can take
values ranging from –1.00 (between the two variables there
is a perfect correlation negative) and +1.00 (between the two
variables there is a perfect correlation positive). A correlation of 0
indicates that between the two variables there is no relationship.
In the ﬁrst table, correlations between errors related to the errors
of attribution are identiﬁed. You can see signiﬁcant positive
correlations between the error and the corresponding inference
tautology (N = 46, r = 0.432, p < 0.05, two-tailed) and between
the norm of internality and the tendency to self-conﬁrmation
(N = 46, r = 0.501, p< 0.05, 2-tailed), for which the variation of
the ﬁrst error also tends to vary that associated. More signiﬁcant
positive correlations are found between the error of the texture
and the attribution to the victim (N = 46, r = 0.334, p < 0.01,
two-tailed), the illusory correlation (N = 46, r = 0.292, p< 0.01,
two-tailed) and the tendency of autoconﬁrmation (N = 46,
r = 0.370, p < 0.01, two-tailed), and between the latter and the
illusory correlation (N = 46, r = 0.362, p < 0.01, two-tailed).
All errors are found to have a signiﬁcant impact on the total
number of errors committed in relation to the ﬁrst outlined
area, particularly those of the tendency to autoconﬁrm (N = 46,
r = 0.671, p< 0.05, two-tailed) and the internality norm (N = 46,
r = 0.554, p< 0.05, two-tailed).
In the second table, correlations between inferential errors
have been identiﬁed. You can see the signiﬁcant positive
correlation between argumentum ad hominem errors and the
heuristic availability (N = 46, r = 0.302, p< 0.01, two-tailed) for
which the variation of one of the two errors also tends to vary the
other. All errors are found to have a signiﬁcant impact on the total
number of errors committed in relation to the second outlined
area, particularly argumentum ad hominem (N = 46, r = 0.702,
p< 0.05, two-tailed) and heuristic availability (N = 46, r = 0.602,
p< 0.05, two-tailed).
In the third table, correlations between epistemological errors
are identiﬁed. You may notice in this case a signiﬁcant negative
correlation between the errors of interpretation argued as
explanations and confusion between value judgments and factual
data (N = 46, r = –0.425, p < 0.05, two-tailed) to indicate that
with increasing of the one, the other tends to decrease or to be
absent. The error of the interpretations reasoned as explanations
is the only area not to have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the total
of epistemological errors committed, while the heavier weights
come from the error of reiﬁcation (N = 46, r = 0.601, p < 0.05,
two-tailed) and the confusion between value judgments and
factual data (N = 46, r = 0.508, p< 0.05, two-tailed).
In the fourth table, correlations between the total errors for
each area, were found to have a signiﬁcant positive about the
overall weight of the total errors of attribution (N = 46, r = 0.717,
p< 0.05, 2-tailed ) and the total of epistemological errors (N = 46,
r= 0.793, p< 0.05, two-tailed) and not the total number of errors
resulting inferential unrelated.
DISCUSSION
Regarding the frequency of errors, you notice that the
epistemological error to exchange a fact for a value judgment
is present in all the expert reports considered and is most
frequently committed (214 errors of 840). Well represented are
also the error of reiﬁcation, present in 43 surveys (158 errors
on 840), the mistake to argue interpretations as if they were
facts, present in 35 expert explanations (94 errors over 840)
and the error of understanding the oﬀense or the rules in
terms of psychological explanation in 32 surveys (96 errors on
840). Ultimately, epistemological errors are the most common.
As for inferential errors and errors of attribution, the data
table shows for the ﬁrst, a greater presence of argumentum
ad hominem, present in 20 surveys (28 errors out of 840)
and the addition of pragmatic inferences in 17 surveys (21
mistakes to 840) and, for the latter, the fundamental attribution
error, present in 20 surveys (28 errors on 840), the norm of
internality in 19 surveys (28 errors over 840) and the trend
in this auto conﬁrmation, present in 18 surveys (27 errors on
840). In terms of absolute frequency, the error that appears
most is treating value judgments as matters of fact, belonging to
the epistemological errors that may contain errors with higher
frequencies. Regarding the correlations between the errors for
each area and in compliance with the global error, you may
notice some signiﬁcant relationships. As for the area of the errors
of attribution, you ﬁnd that the variation of the tautological
errors also varies corresponding to the inference and vice versa
(p < 0.05). This may indicate the positive association between
the explanation of behavior based on psychological traits by
which you identify the same, and the use of pathological traits
of personality or psychological causes or psychopathological to
explain socially disapproved gestures. It is further noted that
the variation of the internalities rule also tends to vary the
auto conﬁrmation trend (p < 0.05). This may indicate the
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positive association between holding a self-determined person
responsible regardless of his conditions, and selecting the
information in order to conﬁrm their beliefs or belittle those that
contradict them. Other signiﬁcant correlations emerge (p< 0.05),
for example one for which the variation of the tendency of
auto conﬁrmation also tends to vary the error of constancy.
In this case, the association could be with the selection of
information described and the prediction of persistence or re-
enactment of behavior, because they “caused” by a stretch of a
personality disorder. Finally, the strongest point over the total
errors of the ﬁrst area concerns the norm of internality and
tendency of auto conﬁrmation, most frequent errors together
with the fundamental attribution error. Compared to the second
area of the errors, inferential, you ﬁnd that the variation of
argumentum ad hominem also tends to vary the availability
heuristic (p< 0.01). This may indicate a relationship between the
information considered reliable of another person, compared to
that of the protagonist because of the attitude that the preliminary
estimate of the possibility that a certain event is present, or
has been present, or may be experienced on a knowledge base-
expectations-questions “available” at the time. These two errors
appear to be those with greater weight on the total inferential
errors. In the third area of epistemological errors, the greatest
weight is given by the errors of reiﬁcation and the confusion
between value judgments and factual data, the most frequent
errors in the area and in general. There is a signiﬁcant negative
correlation (p < 0.05) between the exchange of value judgments
in factual data and interpretation reasoned as an explanation,
so the variation of one tends to vary the other in the opposite
direction. In particular, it is noted that as the ﬁrst increases, the
second decreases of tends to be absent. This may indicate that
the higher the valuations based on a system of values or common
sense presented as objective assessments, the lower (or absent)
are the interpretations or theoretical conjectures presented as
explanations or causes of what are investigated. Finally, the total
attribution and epistemological errors have a signiﬁcant impact
(p < 0.05) on the overall error, unlike the total number of errors
for which no inferential identiﬁes a signiﬁcant correlation.
CONCLUSION
This study highlights how the “systematic errors of judgment,”
usually referring to common sense and the man in the street, are
sometimes present even in the forensic evaluation by specialist
consultants. In all expert reports analyzed, several errors were
identiﬁed, attributable to the following three areas: attribution
errors, inferential errors, and epistemological errors.
The research highlights a signiﬁcant amount of
epistemological errors, as well as allocation and inferential
errors. The fact that the inference attributional errors are
present in much lesser extent, can perhaps be explained by the
increased attention that has been paid to these in academic
research. In reference to the epistemological errors, this data
concurs with what has already been stated by several authors
(Gulotta, 2000; Salvini, 2004), who argue that such errors can be
created when psychologists make their own categories or legal
terms – that have no scientiﬁc evidence in psychology – without
making a “proper translation” (see for example “the ability of
discernment,” “inﬁrmity or mental disorder”). For example,
when, in the evaluation for the purpose of “attribution,” it
resorts to tautological conceptualizations of psychiatric nosology
which is rich (see “reaction to short circuit,” “abnormal reaction,”
“irresistible impulse”). From pondering on the results, the need
to problematize the questions posed by the client legal emerges,
because in some cases the demand that the law addresses the
psychology can induce the psychologist to seek causal relations,
to apportion blame and to identify solutions that psychology
cannot always oﬀer. Hence, the risk of falling into the errors
presented. A further point of reﬂection concerns the adequacy
of psychological theories to which the consultant refers to the
context in which they are used: in fact, if some theories can be
functional to troubleshoot clients in the clinical context, the same
theories are not necessarily eﬀective in the evaluation of people
in the legal ﬁeld.
In conclusion and beginning from how much emerged from
the work presented, some indications can be made operational,
in particular:
(a) in the formation ﬁeld, to raise awareness of the scientists of
the psyche who approach the forensic ﬁeld to monitor their
cognitive processes, include the possibility to incur errors of
reasoning;
(b) in the interdisciplinary relationship, the ability to
problematize the legal questions raised by the client, because
it is the question that deﬁnes and limits the reality in which
the consultant is called to work, so if the psychologist or
psychiatrist must move on paths deﬁned by law, it is possible
that in order to answer a question as it is formulated it
may cause some errors that could invalidate the entire
technical-scientiﬁc procedure;
(c) the opportunity to make known the implications of some
cognitive processes related to technical advice, not only in
who is appointed to carry it out or who is in training, but
also for those who will use the results, namely the lawyers
and judges.
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